INTRODUCTION

Problem and Background
The Report on the Fitness of Officers (FITREP) (Appendix A, Figure A-1) , the principal document used to manage the career of U.S. Navy officers, has two broad but distinct purposes. First, it serves as a record of the senior officer's evaluation of his/her subordinates and, hence, as a basis for decisions affecting the subordinate's future in the Navy (e.g., those involving retention, promotion, training, assignment, and selection for command). Second, it serves as a performance counseling device. The Appraisal Worksheet ( Figure A-2) , which is used in preparing the FITREP, is intended for use by the reporting senior during the performance appraisal discussion.^ There are many problems that limit the FITREP's effectiveness in filling either role. Inflated evaluations have so greatly reduced the spread of performance ratings that their usefulness to selection and promotion boards may be limited. As a result, decisions affecting officers' careers may be based on factors other than performance--certainly undesirable for both the officers and the Navy. The problems with using the FITREP for performance counseling are due to many factors, including system design, a lack of incentives, and what McGregor (1972) attributes to the supervisors' unwillingness to accept the role of "playing Gody^ //^^ (//I Difficulties with performance appraisal are neither new nor unique to the Navy. Vintson (1959) , after a review of the literature, confirmed the well-known fact that inflation was the most common problem in all military evaluation systems. No rating method in the history of the military services has proved workable in the long term. Indeed, some systems, particularly the forced-choice system used by the Army (19^7-1950) and the controlled-rating format used by the Air Force (197'^-1978) , have been near disasters (Phillips, 1979; Vintson, 1959) . Bayless (1981) described the sequence of unsuccessful evaluation systems in the Air Force:
The Air Force, upon its inception in ISttJ, adopted the newly developed Army form but dropped it by 19^9 due to objections to the "Forced Choice Method" and the inflation of the ratings. In 19'f9, it established its own "Critical Incident Technique." It was dropped in 1951 due to its complexities and mechanical problems. From 1952 to 197^, the Air Force used the same system but made numerous modifications due to inflation continually reducing its effectiveness. Then, in 197^^, the OER (officer effectiveness report) continued its evolution by developing a controlled quota system. In 1977, the quota changed again to control only the top block and, by October 1978, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force discontinued all controls, bringing us to the current system.
While the military's problems with performance appraisal are well known, private industry has certainly not been spared its share of difficulties. After a series of lawsuits, employers became increasingly concerned about the legality of their evaluation systems (Kieiman & Durham, 1981) . Cascio (1978) has called performance appraisal "The Achilles Heel" of personnel management.
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Because of the magnitude of the problem and the fact that an organization's future is at stake when it chooses its leaders, extensive efforts have been made since World War II to improve the performance appraisal process. In 196^, a Navy review covered over 100 reports on military performance ratings (Shears, 196^^) . The Navy has been relatively inactive in the area of performance appraisal research during the last two decades; however, the Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard have continued to work on the problem, and to revise their evaluation systems. Table 1 provides a summary of the current officer evaluation methods of the uniformed services.
Purpose
The purpose of this effort was to address two of the most serious problems with the current Navy FITREP system: (1) inflation of performance ratings, and (2) the FITREP's weaknesses as a performance counseling tool. Efforts by the other brcinches of the armed services and by private industry to solve similar problems were noted. Current and, in some cases, proposed performance evaluation systems were considered to determine whether they (1) adequately discriminate levels of performance, (2) control for inflation, (3) provide constructive, job-related feedback to the ratee in a manner likely to enhance motivation, and (^) provide valid information to administrative users at low cost and in a reasonably simple manner. 
APPROACH
Data were obtained by reviewing the pertinent research literature, interviewing fleet officers and cognizant persons in the Naval Military Personnel Command, and surveying over 300 naval officers by means of an anonymous mail-back questionnaire. The complete results of the survey are being published separately (Hearold, Larson, Rimland, & Lahey, 
HNDINGS
Inflation of Performance Ratings Causes of Inflation
Inflation is the practice of systematically assigning ratings higher than those deserved. It is a common source of error in performance appraisal and can seriously undermine the usefulness of an evaluation system. As Pappageorge (197^) has pointed out, to give up trying to cure inflation and propose the development and use of other indices of promotability misses the heart of the matter. To be fair, and to ensure an organization's efficiency, promotions must be based on indices of performance.
Many authors have addressed the causes of inflation in officer ratings (e.g., Blakelock, 1976; Grappe, Alvord, & Poland, 1967; Olsen & Oakman, 1979; Tate, 1978) . The causes that are most commonly identified, most of which are attitudinal in nature, are listed below:
1. Reluctance to impair the motivation of subordinates.
2. The supposition that overall competency in the officer corps may currently be higher than in the past.
3. The opinion that one's own subordinates are better than average. 4. Unwillingness to sacrifice a subordinate to the "up or out" promotion policy.-5. Concern that leniency on the part of other raters will put one's own subordinates at a disadvantage.
6. Desire to enhance group cohesion.
7. Recognition that rewards are severely limited in a military environment.
/ Strategies to Control Inflation
A truly impressive array of strategies has been devised in the effort to solve the problem of inflation. In most cases, these solutions have not failed because of technical problems but, rather, because of a tendency to underestimate the "human side" of appraisal (i.e., its motivational aspects, effect on self-esteem, and concern for fairness). Rossi, Pappajohn, Penny, Bassham, Bussey, Delandro, Doctor, Druit, Fountain, Horst, McGraw, Mitchell, Sanders, Sands, Cauglin, & Malone (197^*) expanded on this concept in their work with the Army. They viewed inflation as an indication of a lack of confidence in the evaluation system. They noted that (1) most efforts have focused on the appraisal form, thereby creating an overemphasis on psychometric and quasi-psychometric technology, (2) the consistent failure of these efforts is ironic since, given sufficient trust and confidence, virtually any evaluation form would work, and (3) the Army has never made a concerted, purposeful effort to implement a program designed to build confidence in the officer evaluation system. Some of the strategies to control inflation, and, where appropriate, the presumed reasons for their failure, are reviewed in the remainder of the section.
Forced-choice System (Army). The Army's experiences with the forced-choice system U9^^7-1950} are of special interest, for they help illustrate the importance of attitudinal factors. This system, which was briefly adopted by the Air Force (where it was referred to as "the forced-choice confusion system of 1947" (Vintson, 1959) ), was designed to combat the inflation that had become an increasingly serious problem since the early 1930s. As Vintson observes:
The procedures required by this form were in direct contrast with previous systems. Rather than indicating how much or how little of each characteristic an officer posessed, it required the rater to choose, from a group of four phrases or single adjectives, one that was most like the officer and one that was most unlike him. It required objective reporting and minimized subjective judgment. The arrangement of the rating elements-sets of four-reduced the rater's ability to produce any predetermined desired outcome by the choice of obviously good or obviously bad traits. In effect, it was designed to eliminate favoritism and personal bias.
The forced-choice form (Form 67-1), which was tested on 50,000 officers, was the first Army efficiency report that was extensively validated and standardized before it was officially adopted. The team that developed it considered it to be superior to any other method.
Although Form 67-1 may have been technically the best form the Army ever had, it was also the most unpopular. Rating officers were unable to determine the rating they were giving and, consequently, felt that they could not make fair and accurate judgments (Taylor, 1952) . Also, the raters complained that they were being forced to say things they did not want to say, and that no provision was made for showing the results to the rated officer. Because of strong opposition from the Army officer corps, the forced-choice procedure was discontinued in 1950. The Air Force had abandoned the system in 19't9.
Controlled-rating Format (Air Force). The Air Force's controlled-rating format, which was in effect from 30 November 197^* to 10 October 1978, is another example of a technically sophisticated system that was abandoned because of negative perceptions. The format contained a controlled "evaluation of potential" section, such that, on a 6-block scale, only 22 percent of the officers rated could receive a rating of "1" and only 50 percent, a rating of "1" or "2."
Interviews with officer personnel quickly revealed widespread negative reactions to this system (Blakelock, 1976; Neary, 1978; Phillips, 1979) . The primary complaint was the requirement that 50 percent of the ratees would receive a rating of "3" or lower. This 50 percent had received two blows: The first blow was the withdrawal of positive reinforcement. As Neary (1978) points out, under the previous, inflated system, more than 90 percent of all officers were receiving the highest possible rating on officer effectiveness reports (OERs). With the implementation of the controlled-rating format in 197^^, 40 percent not only lost their opportunity to be included in the top rating (1) but were excluded from even the second highest rating (2).
Second, officers rated "3" or below perceived that such a rating was a "kiss of death," so far as promotions were concerned. This belief prevailed in spite of the fact that the 22/28/50 percent distribution had been chosen to maintain competitiveness for promotion in the block 3 category (Blakelock, 1976) . Brown (1977) examined the evidence and concluded that officers with "3" ratings in their OER index could not possibly be excluded from promotion because there simply would not be sufficient numbers of officers with better ratings to fill promotion quotas. Even though the actual data tended to refute, or at least dUute, apprehensions about the effect of a "3" rating on promotion potential, anxiety about receiving such a rating continued (Phillips, 1979) . In August 1977, the Air Force responded to these concerns by eliminating controls from all but the top block. A follow-up survey in August 1978 showed that the controlled OER still had a negative impact on ratees' morale, motivation, career plans, and assignments. Thus, on 10 October 1978, all controls were removed from the OER. Phillips (1979) has analyzed the Air Force's experiences with the controlled rating concept. He emphasized the need for considering both the self-image aspects of evaluation and the danger that an evaluation system may be perceived, or misperceived, as hostile. He summarized the Air Force's experience as follows:
The accomplishments of the controlled OER in halting inflation, renewing the importance of the OER in the selection program and improving feedback to officers, were not enough to overcome the perceived loss of self-esteem and the high level of anxiety felt by many officers during the life of the controlled rating system. This was the case even though many of these perceptions regarding the system were largely invalid.
Ironically, participants in a 1971 Air Force Human Resources Laboratory (AFHRL) workshop, who initiated the original effort to establish a new performance appraisal system, had pointed out, quite prophetically, that an appraisal system can function only to the extent that raters and ratees accept and support it (Jacobcik, 1976) .
The obvious point in all this is that, while clever schemes or exercises in psychometric ingenuity may result in short-term apparent solutions to the inflation problem, they may prove detrimental in the long run. By far the most common mistake made in previous efforts by the services has been the tendency to misjudge the response of the officer corps. Any successful course of action must involve a service-wide attempt to build confidence, understanding, and trust of the system. This is especially likely to be necessary for younger officers, who are a product of a changing society in which authority is frequently challenged and in which new avenues of reward are demanded ("New Breed " 1979; Yankelovich, 1979) .
Forced-ranking Procedures (Navy). The Navy currently employs limited forcedranking procedures by requiring the rank-ordering only of ratees nominated for accelerated promotion. There are several reasons for not applying ranking across the entire officer corps. For one, the use of forced ranking without some method of simultaneously controlling for intercommand differences in officer quality is ambiguous and inequitable. Also, a ranking method by itself provides no information regarding the magnitude of differences between ratees (Codron, 1977) . The Army attempted such a system in 1968 but abandoned it a year later when it proved unenforceable. Forty percent of the raters found a reason for not connpleting the rank order portion of the report.
As Blakelock (1976) points out, a comparative ranking system is also a demoralizing experience for 70 to 80 percent of all personnel. Unless carefully implemented, zero-sum methods such as forced ranking can lead to a variety of motivational problems (Russell, Forced Distribution. The appeal of forced-distribution schemes is evident from the fact that, despite the Air Force's highly negative experience with this method, it is still recommended for halting inflation by many researchers (e.g., Bayless, 1981; Neary, 1978 : Russell, 1977 ). Although such a strategy provides clear and concise information in a way that greatly facilitates the job of selection boards, it also entaUs many negative consequences (e.g., Blakelock, 1976; Codron, 1977; Phillips, 1979) , some of which are listed below.
1. Like forced ranking, a forced distribution system is likely to be a demoralizine experience for the majority of ratees.
2. Forced distributions can result in inordinate competitiveness, intentional avoidance of difficult assignments and tasks, and decreased effort on the part of officers whose motivation was diminished by being rated below their expectations.
3. As was the case with a "3" rating under the old Air Force system, raters may perceive, although falsely, that receiving certain ratings makes one unpromotable.
,.,,.'*', °'"Sa"^^^^^°"s or departments with uniformly outstanding personnel may have difficulty creating an acceptable spread of scores. This may result in potential harm to top performers and to the organization, as other top performers will avoid the assignment.
.. , ^-.^^^" ^ supervisor is asked to rate individuals at the bottom part of the distribution, he may begin to think of them as ineffective. If the subordinates sense this attitude. It may, in turn, negatively affect their performance.
Many of the problems with forced-distribution strategies arise as a result of having to single out individuals for the bottom part of the distribution. Several authors have voiced the opinion that this may be an avoidable problem. If one makes the reasonable ^v^t^nf r ^^^^}^^, poorest performers are readily identifiable, regardless of the rating V\l%V^' ir ''T,o?i'^ "^^g^t be necessary only at the upper level of performance. Bayless (1981) , Neary (1978) and Russell (1977) have based their proposals on this idea. In essence, the Idea is that only the top five percent or so of officers would be permitted to ^^?.ir.u ^^'^T '■^^'"^•-^.° °^^^'' '■^^^"g ^^"^'■^^^ ^°"^d be mandated. Torperformers would therefore be recognized and rewarded, while others would not be stigmatized.
^PP^^-" ^° ^ relatively nonthreatening to most rnntrnu !^ZV^^^^' '' "'^^"°' ^^ ^^" accepted. Experience indicates that rigid SS/tUf.^t u ^'^"""^^ °f "'"^h dissatisfaction; it may matter little whether that dissatisfaction is based on accurate or false perceptions.
Indi.^lU'J ^.""t'^^''
and Additional Raters. Endorsement refers to the review, by individuals at the next higher authority level, of performance ratings assigned by supervisors. Grappe, Alvord, and Poland (1967) , in reviewing data from the Air Force, concluded that "a generally consistent finding across all officer grades and all scale levels, except the two categories at the top and one at the bottom, was that the endorser raised the evaluation more often than he lowered it." Bottenberg (1978) , in his study of ratings given Air Force lieutenant colonels from 30 November 197'f to 31 March 1975, found nearly identical means for performance factor ratings given by raters, additional raters, and reviewers. Only rarely were performance factor scores assigned by raters overridden. The differences that did appear on the Evaluation of Potential section were apparently the result of mandatory controls applied to reviewers. All in all, in the absence of provisions for control, the use of endorsers and additional raters does not appear to be effective in dampening inflation. Also, since the use of a single rater is rooted in Navy tradition, any change would probably be resisted.
Rater Training. While some authors (e.g.. Spool, 1978) have reported that inflation can be reduced by training raters to minimize errors such as those due to leniency and halo, there is little evidence that the result will be more accurate and valid ratings (Bernardin & Buckley, 1981; Zedeck & Cascio, 1982) . In fact, there is evidence that such training can actually decrease accuracy in some cases (Bernardin & Pence, 1980) , since a wider spread of scores is not necessarily accompanied by greater observational skills on the part of the rater.
Recently, Mclntyre, Smith, and Hassett (198**) , recognizing the failure of traditional rater training, investigated a different approach. They sought to develop a common frame of reference among raters by having trainees repeatedly view videotapes of job performance, while critiquing, analyzing, and finally, assigning ratings to the performance. Even though the subjects were specifically trained to observe certain behaviors, and the behaviors themselves were viewed under ideal conditions, training improved rating accuracy only minimally.
Anonymous and Confidential Ratings. Landy and Farr (1980) , after reviewing three nonmilitary studies, concluded that ratings given by identified raters are equivalent to those given by anonymous raters. Anonymity, of course, is not the same as confidentiality, but these findings are still of interest. For the single study they reviewed that employed confidential ratings, they found that confidentiality did not affect the mean leniency of ratings but did increase the spread of the ratings.
Research within military settings has tended to provide mixed evidence for the effects of confidentiality on inflation. Robins and Seeley (1956) and Seeley (195'j) , in studies with Army p>ersonnel, found that mandatory showing of ratings is accompanied by increased leniency and by a decreased spread of scores, and that these patterns are maintained over time. The Air Force, however, which employed broad-based restrictions on showing evaluations in the 1960s, found that only temporary improvements resulted from a "no show" policy. In September 1962, AF Form 77 for company grade officers was revised, and the new "no show" p>olicy for all grades was introduced (Grappe, Alvord, & Poland, 1967) . Ratings were not to be discussed with or shown to the officer being rated at the time of the rating; however, the system was not truly confidential since the ratee was free to review the document after it had been placed on file, as is the case with all military evaluations. There was an initial dip in the percentage of evaluations in the two highest scale intervals; however, by 196'f the average rating levels had approached those existing in 1962. In addition to the lack of solid evidence for the effectiveness of confidential ratings in controlling inflation, there are several other arguments against their use:
1. Confidential appraisals have little value as performance counseling tools. An obvious way to circumvent this problem is to restrict the no-show provision to a specific part of the evaluation while sharing the remaining information with the ratee. Dunne (1977) , for example, has suggested that the Evaluation of Potential section on Air Force evaluations be temporarily "closed" in most instances. The Air Force's experiences with the controlled OER are of interest in this context. One of the problems with having special controls or procedures applied to only one section of an apprabal is that, if the controls work, that particular measure will differentiate between individuals to a greater extent than will other measures. This is, of course, the rationale for the controls. Consequently, its value as a discriminator gives the controlled measure great weight. According to Neary (1978) , the result in the Air Force was that promotion boards began to lose sight of the whole man due to this overwhelming emphasis. The gain may or may not be worth the cost.
2. Confidential appraisals fail to deal with several of the root causes of inflation. A distrust of the system and the concern with leniency on the part of other raters are just two examples of probable causes of inflation left unaddressed.
3. Perhaps most important, confidentiality seems likely to evoke a negative response from officer personnel. For example, aui AFHRL survey (Johnson, Meehan, & Wilkinson, 1976) found that the majority of respondents were opposed to a confidential evaluation of p>otential. Also, the majority believed that the proposed closed system would not really be closed. Olsen and Oakman (1979) report that confidential fitness reports appear to have little support among Coast Guard officers. In surveying a sample of naval officers for the effort described herein, Hearold et al. (198^^) found similar objections. Such negative perceptions would undermine the effectiveness of a confidential system. "Rating the Rater." This strategy refers to methods of statistically correcting or adjusting ratings so as to counterbalance the inflationary tendencies of individual raters. Such a strategy has, in one form or another, been advocated by several authors as a control for inflation (e.g.. Brown, 1975; Codron, 1977; Bayless, 1981) . Brown <1975) suggested computing a bias for each rater by comparing his ratings of his subordinates with all of the past marks received by these same officers. Codron (1977) has proposed a variation of rating the rater which he refers to as "rater standardization." His system has four major components:
1. Noncompulsory but closely monitored ranges of acceptable rating distributions for rater use. These ranges would be determined by personnel msuiagers and could vary with grade.
2. A modification of rating forms to illustrate clearly a particular ratee's standing relative to his fellow officers and his rater's degree of leniency for the current rating cycle.
3. A report that traces the historical rating tendencies of each rater (to be collected, stored, and analyzed but released only to the individual).
if. A procedure for collecting, sorting, and summarizing data from individual evaluator histories for use in adjusting rater standards and reporting trends to selection boards.
Although "rating the rater" strategies appear promising, they are difficult to implement when they are most needed; that is, when performance appraisals are inflated. Since everyone rates highly, there is little information on which to differentiate raters. For example, Tupes and Kaplan (1965) compared ratings given by 1,790 Air Force officers during 1960-1961 to the mean OERs given to the same ratees by their superior officers during 1956-1959. They found that when situational differences, including year and form differences, were removed, only about six percent of the ratings deviated by as much as one OER point from one time to the other. Due to this small difference, they concluded that any systematic attempt to identify deviant raters and correct for their tendencies would not significantly improve the OER rating system. It would seem, then, that, unless simultaneously implemented with an additional strategy to increase the spread of scores, correction for rater tendencies is unlikely to offset the effects of inflation. However, since a change of performance appraisal forms often results in a temporary decrease in inflation (Grappe, Alvord, & Poland, 1967) , it might be useful to derive rater profiles when a new form is introduced. The Army took advantage of a change in forms in lune 1979 by implementing DA Form 67-8-2 (Profile Report), which tracks the rating history of senior raters. This information is provided to both selection boards and the raters themselves. According to Bayless (1981) , the profile report, supported by feedback to lenient raters, has been quite successful in curbing inflation.
In summary, when introduced in conjunction with a new form and enforced by headquarters, "rate the rater" strategies may help significantly in counteracting the effects of inflation. Of equal importance is the fact that they appear to be acceptable to the officer corps (Hearold et al., 198^^) .
A few years hence, it is anticipated that selection boards will be able to use interactive computer graphics, with terminals available to the board members during their deliberations, to analyze and display the FITREPs of the entire group of candidates for promotion or of selected subgroups of special interest. Thus, it would be easy to correct for rater leniency and for other confounding factors. It is not too soon to initiate research and development aimed at that goal.
Other Issues in FITREP Design >•
The strategies for controlling inflation discussed in the previous section represent only some of the issues that must be considered in designing an instrument for performance evaluation. Many authors (e.g., Haynes, 1978; Yager, 1981) have expressed the view that evaluations based on personal traits, as is partly the case with the Navy FITREP, are a major source of difficulty. Haynes emphasizes three main problems with the appraisal of personality factors:
The ambiguity of terms leads to appraisals which are biased by the appraisers subjectivity and are, therefore, usually unreliable and invalid. (For example, in one study which demonstrated the ambiguity of personality traits, definitions of "dependability" were obtained from 150 executives. There were l'>7 different concepts presented, with as many eis six different definitions from one person.)
There is no general agreement as to which personality factors contribute, or to what degree, to an individual's performance.
Partly because they lack behavioral specifics, employees are generally unable to change personality traits, so that including them in an appraisal system leads to antagonism and defensiveness rather than improvement. Burke (1972) , in his discussion of the reasons for the poor performance of appraisal systems, also lists emphasis on personality traits as an important source of difficulty. Beer (1981) concurs, stating that feedback containing details of "what" and "how" is much more likely to be heard and considered than broad generalizations and is much more helpful to individuals who want to improve their p>erformance. A report card type rating of traits is said to be "doomed to failure."
Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales (BARS)
The trend in management has been away from appraisal based on personality and towards a focus on performance and results. As a consequence, several innovative approaches have been introduced. Of these, it appears that behaviorally-anchored rating scales (BARS), also referred to as behavior expectation scales (BES), have attracted the most attention. BARS were first proposed by Smith and Kendall (1963) . According to Schwab, Heneman, and DeCotis (1975) , developing BARS for a particular job typically consists of five steps:
1. Critical incidents. Subject matter experts (SMEs) who are familiar with the job describe incidents of effective and ineffective job behavior.
2. Performance dimensions. Collected incidents are clustered into smaller sets of performance dimensions.
3. Retranslation. A second group of SMEs is given the list of critical incidents and dimension definitions and asked to assign each incident to the dimension that it best describes. Incidents not reassigned to the original dimension by the second group of SMEs are eliminated. Typically, an incident is retained if 50 to 80 percent of the second group assigns it to the same dimension as did the first group. f. Scaling incidents. Generally, the second group of SMEs is also asked to rate the behavior described in the incident. The average rating assigned the incident identifies the degree to which it represents effective performance on the dimension to which it is assigned. Incidents for which there is wide disagreement are excluded from the final instrument.
5. Final instrument. A subset of incidents (usually 6 or 7 per dimension) meeting the above criteria is used to develop behavioral anchors for the performance dimensions. The final BARS instrument usually consists of a series of vertical scales, one for each dimension, anchored by the retained incidents. The incident's location on the scale depends on the rating established in step t^.
Because of the detailed focus of BARS on behavior, some authors (e.g., Murphy, 1980) have recommended that they be included in military performance appraisal systems. The Coast Guard has recently adopted their use, and the Navy has made at least one effort to develop behaviorally-based scales (Borman, Dunnette, & Johnson, 197'f) . Several recent reviews of the literature, however, have raised questions about the overall value of BARS. The issues that appear most relevant to the current discussion are their cost and their psychometric value as measures of performance. Kingstrom and Bass (1981) and Schwab et al. (1975) , after conducting exhaustive reviews of the literature regarding the psychometric aspects of BARS, concluded that, despite their intuitive appeal, there is little reason to believe that BARS are superior to other evaluation instruments in terms of such important criteria as inflation, halo, spread of performance ratings, reliability, and validity. The same can be said for behavioral ratings in general (Bell, Hoff, &: Hoyt, 1963; DeCotis, 1977; Kavanagh, 1971; Stagner, 1977; Massey, Mullins, & Earles, 1978; Borman & Dunnette, 1975) . Landy and Farr (1980) report a continuing problem with identifying anchors for the central portions of the scales and a dispute concerning the usefulness of scales outside of the specific setting in which they were developed. Also, the evidence for the purported positive effects of behaviorally-based performance feedback and rater participation in scale construction is mixed at best (Friedman & Cornelius, 1976; Horn, DeNisi, Kinicki, & Bannister, 1982) . Further, almost all of the researchers agree that BARS are expensive to produce. Landy and Farr (1980) conclude that "in general, the comparisons of the BARS method with alternative graphic methods make it difficult to justify the increased time investment in the BARS development procedure." At a more theoretical level, behavior ratings are likely to be influenced by the very trait inferences and judgments that they are designed to avoid, since memory for behaviors appears to be structured by general impressions (Murphy, Martin, & Garcia, 1982) .
Although the evidence at this point seems to weigh against the use of BARS, several authors criticize such conclusions and still see promise in the method. For example, Bernardin and Smith (1981) maintain that much of the research on BARS published subsequent to the seminal article by Smith and Kendall (1963) has deviated from the original methodology. The Smith and Kendall procedure called for numerous observations of behavior to be made throughout the appraisal period, each individually scaled with the established anchors as a context. A summary rating based on these data was to be made at the end of the rating period. Unfortunately, several discussions of BARS have characterized them as a rating format in which the rater simply reads the dimension definitions and incidents at the end of a rating period and then marks the incident that represents the most "typically expected behavior." Bernardin and Smith feel that at least some of the critical research is thereby invalid. However, the implementation of the original method would thus be much more difficult.
All things considered, BARS are probably not significantly better as perforrhance measures than are the type of graphic rating scales currently in use by the Navy. The present FITREP covers specific aspects of performance, as well as personality traits. Given the present state of appraisal research, there seems to be no compelling reason to change to a new format other than to recover ground lost to inflation. The present system could, however, be improved by providing expanded definitions of the personality traits in the appraisal worksheet. Suggestions are given below:
1. Analytic ability-Quality of thought. Ability to organize and integrate information, deal with problems critically and objectively, establish suitable priorities, and look at both short-range and long-range consequences.
2. Imagination-Resourcefulness, creativeness. Ability to devise alternative solutions to problems.
'^' Personal behavior-Demeanor, sociability, and public behavior. The extent to which an individual represents the Navy with dignity and sets an exannple of good conduct for subordinate personnel.
5. Forcefulness-Positive and enthusiastic performance of duty. The extent to which an individual exerts a positive influence on other individuals and on the Navy and shows commitment to action.
6. Military bearing-Smartness of appearance, correctness of uniform, physical fitness, and adherence to weight standards.
Further, the current form can be simplified by eliminating several blocks that have, in practice, little value for selection boards, such as blocks 77-79 ("weaknesses discussed") and 53-56 ("trend of performance").
Although there have been no real breakthroughs in the design of performance rating scales, new formats should be evaluated from time to time in an attempt to improve discrimination. In the survey of officer opinions (Hearold et. al., 198'f) , the sample of fleet officers was asked to evaluate five performance rating scales and select the one they would most prefer to have on the FITREP form (see Figure 1 ):
1. Current format (blocks 51 and 52). 2. Total range of off icer value format. 3. Distance from average format. ^. Local distribution format. 5. Varying promotion rate format.
Thirty-two percent of the sample selected "the total range of officer value" format (//2 on Figure 1 ) compared to 29 percent for blocks 51 and 52 of the current FITREP, the second most preferred format. Although endorsement by fleet officers does not guarantee that the new format will help guard against inflation, it might prove helpful. Its inclusion on an experimental basis in the next FITREP is recommended, along with explicit instructions to prevent misuse or misunderstanding.
The FITREP Narrative
Unfortunately, when FITREP performance blocks fail to distinguish adequately between officers, as is the case when ratings are inflated, selection boards must often rely on "nuances, oddities, and subtleties" (Hearing, 1980) . Thus, the FITREP narrative section gains added importance as board members seek information on which to base their decisions. The narratives themselves, however, too often are a reflection of the writer's skill rather than of the ratee's accomplishments. Further, research shows rather low agreement between judges reading such narratives, when the judges are asked for their assessment of relative performance (Coyle & Gorman, 1970) .
There are at least two ways of improving the quality of FITREP narratives. The first is by restricting their length to half a page, thus requiring raters to report only the most noteworthy aspects of a ratee's performance. The second is to emphasize the reporting of specific accomplishments, events, or behaviors. These could, in large part, be derived from a list of accomplishments submitted by the ratee as part of the performance counseling process (submission of a list of accomplishments by ratees is discussed further on pages 17 and 21). These two changes would facilitate the task of selection boards by lessening the amount of reading and interpretation required when evaluating performance narratives.
1. Current Format. Shown below are blocks 51 and 52 on the current fitness report form. These two blocks are intended to represent an officer's overall contribution to the Navy. In the EVALUATION block (51), a rater marks a particular subordinate. In the SUMMARY block (52), the rater indicates all the ratings he/she has given to officers of the subordinate's grade. {Selected by 29%} Figure 1 . Five possible performance rating scales rated by sample of fleet officers.
:> Larger Issues
Pervading this report is the finding that appraisal research, as well as the "innovative" methods and formats produced, has failed to live up to expectations. In industry, surveys continue to show both a widespread dissatisfaction with and a short life-span for appraisal systems (Teel, 1980; Cohen & laife, 1982) . It seems obvious that there are important factors that have been overlooked in most attempts to design new systems. User acceptability of the system is an example of a fundamental factor that has too often been ignored in the military. Several other issues should also be kept firmly in mind.
First, organizational factors can overwhelm any system (Zammuto, London, & Rowland, 1982) . As Tenopyr and Oeltjen (1982) point out, too much research has been conducted on rating formats and not enough on the rating context. For example, an "upor-out" promotion policy, such as that used in the American military, will guarantee inflationary pressure on any appraisal system regardless of the format used. Simply put, the likelihood of obtaining an honest evaluation is reduced if the result is harm to another individual (Kearney, 1978) . Research into alternatives to the up-or-out system may, in the long run, be as productive as appraisal research per se. Recently, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) provided for limited suspension of "up-or-out." As the Navy finds itself increasingly dependent on the skills of highly specialized officers (e.g., computer technologists) who have traded intensive narrow training for broad experience, an increase in the number of up-or-out waivers may be necessary.
Second, tradition and habit can be severe stumbling blocks when implementing new systems. Behavior change in the desired direction should not be left to chance. Reward mechanisms, educational campaigns, and other strategies are often needed to bring about compliance. Individuals must be motivated if behavior goals are to be achieved (Bolt & Rummler, 1982) .
Third, there will always be inaccuracy and subjectivity in performance ratings, no matter what format is used. Borman (1978) has shown that raters disagree significantly, even in a nearly ideal environment for obtaining performance ratings. Further, raters and ''atees will differ in their perceptions of the latter's performance. In general, employees tend to have an exaggerated view of their achievements (Meyer, Kay, & French, 1965; Thornton, 1980; Kerr, 1982) . Ilgen, Peterson, Martin, and Boeschen (1981) reported-that, "even when the feedback was very straightforward and presented on a scale with which employees were very familiar, employees still overestimated their own performance." Hearold et al. (198'f) found that more than half of their sample of over 300 officers judged themselves as being in the top 10 percent of officers of their rank. On the other hand, supervisors are influenced by such factors as likeability (Thorndike, 19if9) and the extent to which the rater perceives his subordinates support him and his goals (Kipnis, 1960) . Clarkin (1973) found that the "need to create a good impression" was more strongly related to Navy performance ratings than any other personality factor. There are many potential sources of error and conflict in performance ratings, some of which may be impossible to avoid or correct.
Assessment Centers
Another method of selecting individuals for promotion or special assignment is the use of assessment centers, where candidates are systematically observed and evaluated on their performance of a series of structured tasks or exercises. The participants, who must usually spend several days at the assessment center, are rated on a number of dimensions by trained assessors. Although caution is urged by some authors (e.g., Sackett, 1982; Klimoski & Strickland, 1977) , the evidence seems to indicate that assessment centers are at least as valid as are traditional means of evaluation (Cohen, Moses, & Byham, 1977; Cascio & Silbey, 1979) . Possibly because of the number of positive research findings and the fact that the U.S. courts have endorsed the assessment center process as fair in a number of decisions, the method has been adopted at one time or another by over 1000 organizations (Cohen, 1980) . There has also been periodic interest in military applications, particularly by the Army (Smith, 1978) . There are, nevertheless, considerations that would appear to limit the usefulness of assessment centers. Codron (1977) concluded that, given the requirement for a wide variety of expertise, extensive facilities, and considerable time and travel expenses, assessment centers would be a prohibitively expensive means of regularly evaluating officers being considered for promotion. Any use of the method would, from a practical standpoint, need to be restricted to relatively small numbers of individuals. The British, German, Australian, and Israeli armed forces, with their smaller numbers of personnel, all employ assessment center technology of one type or another (Farr, 1980; McKenna, 1979) . Codron has proposed that an acceptable American variation might be to limit the assessment center approach to officers nominated for accelerated promotion. McKenna (1979) feels that assessment centers may be practical for commanders and captains, particularly for selection to initial or major command. The number of officers involved under such restrictions might be feasible from the cost standpoint. In summary, while assessment centers are not a realistic alternative to the fitness report, they might provide useful information under certain circumstances.
Performance Appraisal Interview
A major component of the performance evaluation process is the performance appraisal interview. Paralleling the perplexing inflation problem in evaluation is an equally intractable problem in supervision: providing meaningful guidance feedback to subordinates (Hood, 1980) . The problem appears to have several sources. First, the form typically used in military appraisal tends to focus on the ratee's general characteristics rather than on job-specific behaviors. Second, at present, superiors have few incentives for investing their time and energy in what is usually considered an inherently unpleasant and often counterproductive task. Unfortunately, as ratees, military officers share the common human fault of regarding most criticism as being unwarranted.
The Need for Separate Systems in At present. Navy appraisal interviews are closely tied to the FITREP, both function and in timing.
Nevertheless, most authorities on performance appraisal recommend the use of dual systems-one for counseling and one for evaluation. Sashkin (1981) stated that research at General Electric "demonstrated beyond doubt that a clear separation of the incongruent judge and helper roles led to a more effective appraisal system in terms of employee satisfaction and performance improvement." Beer (1981) , Burke (1972) , Rilling (1980 ), Clarkin (1973 ), and Yager (1981 all stressed the need for separate performance review and promotion processes or systems. The following sections address two major issues that arise at this point if a separate counseling system is advisable:
(1) what incentives will help to bring about a meaningful and useful performance counseling interview, and (2) what timing and format will produce optimum results.
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The Need for Incentives As noted earlier, military performance counseling efforts suffer from the same vulnerability that has undermined the various attempts to control inflation: No system can work unless it has the support of the officer corps. Regardless of how ideal a system may appear in theory, it will fail unless senior officers are motivated to invest time and energy in interactions with their subordinates. Unfortunately, reluctance to make this investment appears to be widespread. Beer (1981) has discussed the "vanishing performance appraisal":
In many organizations, supervisors report that they hold p>eriodic appraisal interviews and give honest feedback, while their subordinates report they have not had a performance appraisal for many years or they have heard nothing negative. The appraisals conducted by the supervisor seem to "vanish." What probably happens is that supervisors, fearful of the appraisal process, have talked in very general terms to the subordinates, alluding only vaguely to problems. This reluctance is understandable. As McGregor (1972) observes, it reflects an unwillingness to play God. Also, it permits supervisors to avoid immediate or unpleasant interpersonal friction, albeit often at the expense of the organization's goals. Separating the performance feedback aspects of appraisal from the evaluation process and making the forms less person-oriented and more job-oriented both seem to be important ways of reducing the aversiveness of the face-to-face interaction. There are, however, at least two other fx>ssibilities worth considering.
First, subordinate participation should be emphasized. The Army has overcome reluctance to hold formal appraisal interviews to some extent by making the initiation of the interviews a joint superior and subordinate responsibility.^ Mandating this sharing of responsibility makes a meaningful exchange of views and expectations much more likely.
Second, the rater's job should be made easier. Sashkin (1981) identified ten characteristics of effective performance appraisal systems. His first criterion was whether or not managers are rewarded for developing their subordinates. The time and effort invested by a manager in coaching subordinates should directly benefit the manager. Similarly, Burke (1972) , in an article titled, "Why performance appraisal systems fail," lists the absence of incentives for employee performance counseling as one reason. According to Burke, "if the organization says employee development is important but does not act accordingly, the manager will only pay lip service to this objective." Under the structure of the current Navy FITREP system, it appears, at least on the surface, that raters have little reason to engage in meaningful performance counseling. One of the widely overlooked benefits of such interactions, however, is that they help to familiarize superiors with the work of their subordinates. At a very minimum, such interviews should greatly facilitate the completion of the fitness report. To maximize this benefit, subordinates should be encouraged to submit, for use during the interview, written input concerning their accomplishments. Some commands already use this concept in the form of locally designed "brag sheets." Such input would be especially useful to the reporting senior when completing the narrative section of the FITREP. The procedure would also allow the ratee an opportunity to provide direct input into the rating process. A survey of naval officers by Clarkin (1973) found that over 80 percent desired more input to the FITREPs submitted on them by their superiors.
•Miller, 1. Personal communication, 29 April 1983.
Choosing a Format; Management by Objectives
During the last decade, much interest has centered on the strategy of management by objectives (MBO), in which performance is assessed by comparing it with established goals. In the typical MBO procedure, an employee and his supervisor (1) agree on the employee's performance goals and (2) meet periodically to assess progress towards those goals. If necessary, appraisal criteria are revised from time to time. Frequent counseling, feedback, and supervisor/subordinate interaction, as well as an apparent high level of objectivity, are the key features of MBO systems. As objectives are accomplished, new ones are established. The Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, and the Army currently employ MBO-type methodologies as part of their appraisal sytems.
The main advantages and disadvantages of MBO systems have been discussed by various authors (e.g., Bayless, 1981; McKenna, 1979; Beer & Ruh, 1976; Yager, 1981) . The purported advantages are listed below:
1. Since they are performance-oriented, rather than trait-oriented, they minimize subjectivity.
2. They elicit commitment from the ratee in addition to providing him or her with feedback.
3. They help establish a strong superior/subordinate relationship. 4. They focus attention on future performance rather than on past failures. 5. They are flexible, nonzero sum systems. 6. They provide well chosen objectives, which can be good motivators.
MBO systems also have several disadvantages: 1. They increase the risk that performance may be viewed in too narrow a context. 2. They may be unrealistic, in that they try to establish accurate objectives a year in advance.
3. Some employees are said to be uncomfortable with setting their own goals. While research has provided strong support for goal setting (Locke, Saari, Shaw, & Latham, 1981) , MBO systems per se have not been clearly shown to be especially effective (Levinson, 1970; Sokolik, 1978; Aplin, Schoderbek, & Schoderbek, 1979; Ford & McLaughlin, 1982) . After analyzing 185 studies, Kondrasuk (1981) concluded that research support for MBO was inversely related to the rigor of the research. While all the case studies reviewed were favorable, actual experiments provided mixed support at best. He concluded that, although MBO can be effective, questions remain about the circumstances in which it is likely to succeed.
Perhaps most relevant to our interests are the experiences of the other services with MBO. Murphy (1980) concluded that MBO-based performance counseling goals frequently are not met in the Marine Corps, primarily because officers are generally reluctant to counsel their subordinates. Unless such reluctance can be overcome, it is doubtful that any system will succeed.
The popularity of MBO, despite its disadvantages, suggests that it is perceived as filling a need for structure and explicitness in supervisory relations, albeit MBO fills the need poorly.
The present authors feel that a significant amount of supervisory dissatisfaction with subordinate performance may result from subordinates not adequately understanding their duties and priorities as perceived by the supervisor. MBO provides a formalized-{jerhaps too formalized-attempt to avert such misunderstandings. A highly simplified version could provide many of the same benefits.
To determine the need for enhanced supervisor-subordinate agreement on duties and priorities, the sample of 300 naval officers surveyed (Hearold et al. 198^ ) was asked whether they felt the counseling process should include a formal procedure for clarifying the exact nature and priorities of a subordinate's duties. Over 80 percent responded affirmatively (definitely yes, 50%; probably yes, 32%). A follow-up question was asked concerning the scheduling of both the proposed assignment conference and a proposed performance review:
"Assume that formal discussions of assignments (so that both rater and ratee understand explicitly what is expected of the ratee) and periodic reviews of an officer's performance are to be conducted on one or more occasions during each fitness report cycle. On the timeline below, put an "A" where you think the formal assignment conference(s) should be scheduled, and a "P" where you think the formal performance review(s) should take place." A clear majority (62%) of the respondents indicated that the assignment conference should be scheduled 12 months prior to the FITREP due date. A substantial plurality (k2%) preferred that the formal performance review be scheduled 6 months prior to the FITREP submission. While such circumstances as change of command or reassignment of an officer may require some rescheduling, this could be easily provided for in implementing instructions.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
One purpose of this review has been to determine why so many past attempts to halt inflation have failed. A prime source of difficulty has been negative reactions by the officer corps to the introduction of rating formats that they perceived as being ambiguous, unjust, and, in some cases, threatening. Although efforts to design and implement appraisal programs have been uniformly well-intentioned, there has been a consistent failure to give adequate consideration to the "human side" of appraisal.
Of the strategies for controlling inflation reviewed, "rating the rater" (rater profiles) appears to have the most merit. This method has recently been implemented by the Army and Coast Guard with at least temporary success. Its introduction is best carried out in conjunction with other system revisions, such as new forms and procedures, to take advantage of the reduced inflation.
Several additional points should be considered with respect to rater profiles. Due to the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts, the raters themselves could request information on rating tendencies, once it becomes a matter of official record. If the profiles facilitated comparisons between raters, one likely outcome would be a sudden rating increase for "low" raters. High raters, being less conspicious, would be less inclined to change their standards. The problem of inflation might therefore be compounded, at least initially.
The type of profile used by the Army provides for no interrater comparisons ( Figure  2 ). Since the profile displays both the total distribution of marks given by an individual rater and the rating he has given to a particular subordinate, a rating can be viewed in the context of the rater's general tendencies. To be successful, such a system might require that feedback be given to serious inflaters. Marking a reasonable distribution of scores could itself be used as a performance factor by selection boards when a rater's own turn to be evaluated arose. Other enforcement mechanisms, such as letters of reprimand, could also be employed to correct reporting seniors who overrate seriously and consistently.
A further issue is the question of which block or blocks should be involved in the profile. For the Army, the "evaluation of potential" block is involved. The Navy has no such rating factor. Getting a useful spread of ratings should be easier on a new factor than on one contaminated by previous rating tendencies. An "evaluation of potential" block, introduced on a new form, would facilitate the successful development of rater profiles in the Navy.
Other Issues in FITREP Design
As Landy and Farr (1980) state, "After more than 30 years of serious research, it seems that little progress has been made in developing an efficient and psychometrically sound alternative to the traditional graphic rating scale." The type of appraisal form currently used in the Navy, with its combination of traits, behaviors, and narrative, has not been significantly improved upon, despite the theoretical appeal of proposed alternatives such as BARS. Nevertheless, the current form can be improved by (1) including better definitions in the appraisal worksheet and (2) shortening the narrative section, with emphasis on specific accomplishments. In addition, the new "total range of officer value" format should be adopted, on a trial bcisis, to evaluate its effects on inflation.
Performance Appraisal Interviews
The performance appraisal literature almost uniformly agrees that performance counseling and evaluation should be separate processes. Ideally, these processes should be supported by separate documents. The Army and the Coast Guard have recently adopted this strategy. However, there is less agreement as to the performance counseling document itself and the way it is used.
As noted earlier, there is abundant evidence that MBO has not lived up to initial expectations. Rather than employing MBO, it seems desirable that the Navy implement a relatively simple Assignment Conference Form (see Figure A-3) . In completing this form, the superior and subordinate should reach a clear understanding as to the subordinate's duties and priorities. The first page of the proposed form requires a listing of duties in order of priority. (Understanding between superiors and subordinates on job duties can positively influence the perceived fairness and accuracy of performance evaluation (Landy, Barnes, & Murphy, 1978) ). This section, which should be completed at the beginning of the rating period, allows the rater and ratee to exchange views and expectations. The conference and the completion of the form would be both a mandated and a shared responsibility. A midyear performance review should be held to assess progress, discuss ways to improve performance, and, if necessary, revise duties. Near the end of the rating period, the subordinate would complete and submit the second part of the form, which lists the specific accomplishments achieved in the context of his duties. The subordinate and supervisor then have a final meeting. Soon afterward, when the reporting senior completes a FITREP on the officer, he will have at his disposal a document describing specific accomplishments on which to base his ratings. When he actually submits the FITREP, he will also send the prioritized list of the officer's duties to personnel headquarters, where it will provide valuable input to selection boards.
Conclusions
Performance appraisal is an area fraught with many problems-for the raters, the ratees, and the administrative users. Given that there will never be a perfect system, the two most important conclusions to emerge from this study are:
1. The problems in military performance appraisal result primarily from attitudinal factors, rather than from psychometric issues. It has been found repeatedly that acceptance by the officer corps is essential for the success of a performance appraisal system.
2. Reliance on a single instrument and occasion for both performance evaluation and performance counseling purposes is ill-advised. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on results of this effort and those of Hearold et al. (l9Zit) , it is recommended that the Navy's FITREP system be modified as follows:
1. Implement a beginning-of-year assignment conference and midyear assignment review conference between the ratee and the reporting senior, to be held 12 and 6 months prior to the FITREP completion date. These interviews are intended to ensure mutual and clear understanding of the subordinate's duties and priorities. A proposed assignment conference worksheet has been designed to facilitate and document these meetings (Figure A-3) . ^ 2. Revise the appraisal worksheet by providing expanded definitions of the traits.
3. Revise the current FITREP form by (a) reducing the amount of space for the narrative, (b) requiring that the narrative describe specific accomplishments, (c) implementing an "evaluation of potential" section, (d) deleting blocks 53-56 and 77-79 ("trend of performance" and "weaknesses discussed"), and (e) including the "total range of officer value" scale on an experimental basis.
t^. Develop rater profiles for the "evaluation of potential" section, with a feedback and enforcement mechanism for dealing with flagrant inflators.
5. Introduce all changes with a significant educational campaign, beginning several months prior to actual system changes.
6. Initiate preliminary research directed toward developing an interactive computer graphics system that would enable selection boards to make on-line inquiries of a data ^se consisting of all FITREP data for ratees.
7. Make more use of provisions in the recently enacted DOPMA enabling selective waiver of the "up-or-out" system. These provisions should be broadened to permit a larger range of exceptions to up-or-out. Such policy modifications will become increasingly important as larger numbers of officers become involved in narrow but vitally important areas of specialization (e.g., computer technology).
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